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INTRODUCTION
Continuous monitoring and measurement of credit risk in
mortgage portfolios is of particular importance, as
demonstrated by the financial crises that began in August
2007. The underpricing of risk and the spread of complex
financial instruments have contributed significantly to
financial strains and tightening credit conditions, which are
now exacerbating the world-wide recession.
As in many countries, mortgage loans play a dominant role in
retail lending in Hungary. At the end of 2008, 31 per cent of
banks’ interest income was related to these products, and these
loans accounted for approximately two thirds of the total
household loan portfolio (HUF 5,800 billion, of which HUF
4,300 billion was foreign currency-denominated debt at end-
2008).
Although there have been no signs of substantial deterioration
in the creditworthiness of Hungarian mortgage borrowers on
the scale of the developments in the USA so far, a continuous
increase in the default risk of these loans has been seen. The
default probability (the probability of falling into payment
arrears in the coming year) of retail mortgage loans advanced
to 3.8 per cent in 2008, from 2.4 per cent in 2005.
1
Although mortgage-type loans usually bear moderate default
and recovery risks for financial institutions compared to
other retail products, the build-up of real estate market
concentration may make the banking sector sensitive to
housing price fluctuations. In addition, due to FX lending, a
substantial, permanent exchange rate depreciation may add
not only to default risk, but – through the change in the
forint value of outstanding debts- also to recovery risk. This,
in turn, might jeopardise the financial stance of credit
institutions, ultimately affecting the stability of the
Hungarian economy. Therefore, it is very important to
develop a stress testing framework for analysing the
mortgage portfolio’s risk sensitivity to adverse macro
shocks.
In this study, using three commercial banks’ retail mortgage
loan portfolios (monthly data from January 2003 to June
2008 on 200,000 debtors with housing and home equity
loans), the risk characteristics of these loans is analysed. We
then describe the methodology developed for investigating
the portfolio’s macro shock sensitivity (stress testing
framework). Finally, in an illustrative manner, we present the
use of these models for stress testing purposes in an extreme
macro-risk scenario (10 per cent decline in GDP; exchange
rate of EUR/HUF 340, in line with the stress path of the April
2009 Report on Financial Stability).
RISK CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RETAIL
MORTGAGE LOAN PORTFOLIO
Mortgage portfolio quality is fundamentally determined by
two interdependent factors: the share of loans granted in
different years within the outstanding loan stock (vintage
effect), and the ‘ageing’ of the portfolio.
Taking into account the ‘ageing’ effect in determining the
portfolio’s riskiness is important, as empirical evidence
indicates that the closer the loan is to the date of expiry, the
In this study, using three commercial banks’ retail mortgage loan portfolios (consisting of approximately 200,000 clients with
housing and home equity loans), we analyse the risk characteristics of the portfolio, identify customer-specific and product-specific
factors, and market and macroeconomic factors that influence portfolio quality, and finally calculate the loan loss on the retail
mortgage portfolio of the banking sector in an extreme macro-risk scenario (10 per cent decline in GDP; exchange rate of EUR/HUF
340). Our findings suggest that the loans’ denomination structure, the initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the debtor’s level of
education can be considered as the main customer-specific and product-specific drivers of default risk, while the unemployment
rate, domestic and foreign interest rates as well as the exchange rate constitute the major macro-risk factors impacting defaults.
Based on our calculations, in the macro-risk scenario the total loss on the retail mortgage loan portfolio of the banking sector would
amount to HUF 372 billion, which is approximately 6 per cent of the end-2008 mortgage loan portfolio.
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1Values computed on the basis of the retail banking database.lower the default risk is. International empirical evidence
suggests that defaults mostly occur within four years after
loan origination (see, for example, Gross and Souleles,
2001), but then the ratio of problem loans decreases
progressively as a function of loan age.
In addition to the ‘ageing’ effect, the other factor that
determines portfolio quality is the ‘vintage effect’. The
‘vintage effect’ captures the impact of the time period (year)
of loan origination on portfolio quality. Due to the different
macroeconomic and market circumstances, the life cycle of
loans may differ depending on the year they were granted.
For instance, if banks grant credit with eased conditions in a
certain year (i.e. higher starting LTV ratios, longer maturity,
etc.) then due to easing liquidity constraints borrowers with
a tight financial stance may gain access to the credit market.
As a result, financial institutions can grant more credit, but
banks can also expect that as a proportion more clients may
encounter payment problems compared to years in which
lending standards were tighter.
2 This can have a significant
influence on the portfolio’s riskiness, especially if a large
share of the portfolio is comprised of ‘cohorts’ with an
unfavourable risk profile.
Between 2004 and 2007, the lending standards of retail
mortgage loans eased considerably (the average initial LTV
and maturity of housing loans increased by 30 per cent
during this period), resulting in 29 per cent nominal growth
in the average loan amount and a 12 per cent increase in the
initial loan instalment (Table 1).
The easing of lending standards resulted in a ‘dilution’ of the
portfolio, as shown by the differences in mortgage vintage
curves between 2004 and 2007 depicted in Chart 1. The
chart demonstrates the less favourable life cycle (risk profile)
of credits which were originated later. For example, while
approximately 1 per cent of mortgage loans granted in 2004
became non-performing one year after origination,
3 for loans
granted in 2007 this ratio was already close to 7 per cent.
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Note: The table shows Swiss franc loans, as this was the key currency in the period under review. Initial loan instalments were quantified using the credit
conditions presented in the table (amount of loan, maturity, APR), assuming annuity type constructions.
2004 2005 2006 2007
Average housing loan amount taken (CHF-based) 5,900,000 HUF 6,300,000 HUF 6,800,000 HUF 7,600,000 HUF
Average starting maturity of housing loans (Year) 16 18 20 21
Average starting LTV of housing loans (Per cent) 47% 54% 58% 61%
Average yearly APR of CHF-based housing loans 5.94% 5.96% 5.82% 6.04%
Starting loan installment of an average CHF-based housing loan 47,683 HUF 47,637 HUF 47,994 HUF 53,302 HUF
Table 1
Changes in lending standards between 2004 and 2007
Chart 1
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Note: As the number of loans granted before 2004 is relatively small in the
sample, the vintage curve for 2004 contains loans granted in and before
2004. The chart does not show the vintage curve of loans granted in 2008,
as observations for 2008 as a whole were not available.
2 However, if the banking behaviour is prudent (i.e. pricing of credit risk and reserve accumulation is adequate) this lending policy does not necessarily threaten the
capital position of banks. Higher credit risk is validated in the loan price, which on the one hand increases default risk, on the other hand banks can realise significant
“loss-compensated” revenues on clients who are willing to and are able to pay the higher cost of credit.
3 We define those borrowers to be in default who are past due more than 90 days on any credit obligation, or those that can be considered highly unlikely to be able
to pay their credit obligations (BCBS, 2006). In the database, on the basis of the aforementioned definition, the three banks identified the defaulting debtors with the
help of a binary variable (0, 1) We denote the ratio of the number of vintage k loans experiencing a default at ages over the number of vintage k loans with no default
for age<s by Ps











1 1It is important to note that changes in lending standards and
macroeconomic developments are not independent of one
another. On the one hand, looser lending standards may result
in a ‘dilution’ of the portfolio, which may appear in the
growing number of defaults and increasing portfolio sensitivity
to macroeconomic shocks. On the other hand, the growth
surplus caused by the additional lending may improve the
macro fundamentals over the short run, and might reduce the
‘default increase’ due to macroeconomic shocks. However,
over the long run, the build-up of a riskier portfolio and a
standstill in economic growth may result in significant losses.
4
STRESS TESTING FRAMEWORK FOR THE
RETAIL MORTGAGE LOAN PORTFOLIO
5
In this section, we outline the methodology developed for
investigating the retail mortgage loan portfolio’s sensitivity to
macro shocks. The models and assumptions are presented,
through which macroeconomic factors can be linked to the risk
parameters influencing the developments in banks’ losses: the
probability of default (PD), loss given default and exposure.
Probability of default
In order to explore the extent and direction of the relations
between the developments in defaults and the factors
influencing solvency, regression analysis is performed. The
applied method (survival analysis) allows us to
simultaneously consider the vintage and portfolio ageing
effects, customer-specific and product-specific factors as well
as market and macro-risk factors on defaults.
In estimating the PD model, the first step is to define the
default event. The definition of defaulted loans is similar to
that established in Basel II. Namely, obligors that are past due
more than 90 days on any credit obligation, or those that can
be considered highly unlikely to be able to pay their credit
obligations are considered to be in default (BCBS, 2006). The
next step is to obtain the determinants of default from a large
group of possible covariates. The scope of explanatory
variables, in turn, was selected on the basis of their
explanatory power. Accordingly, the denomination structure
of loans (FX/HUF), the type of loan (housing/home equity),
the initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, the borrower’s level of
education, the unemployment rate, the 3-month Bubor and
Euribor rates as well as the percentage deviation between the
CHF/HUF exchange rate level at which the individual loan
was granted from the actual CHF/HUF exchange rates
proved to be the variables with significant explanatory
power. The general form of the model is as follows:
DR=f(LD, LT, LTV, E, U, EXCHR, IR), (1) 
where DR is the default risk, LD is the loan denomination,
LT is the type of loan, LTV is the initial loan-to-value ratio,
E denotes the borrower’s educational level, U is the
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Marginal effects of model variables on default risks
4 In the case of small, open economies such as Hungary, the aforementioned mechanism is far from perfect; as the economic cycle and thus portfolio quality may be
more strongly influenced by the change in external demand than by internal lending amplified domestic demand.
5 For a detailed description of the models presented in this chapter see the English-language study by Dániel Holló (2009) entitled ‘Modelling loan losses on the
Hungarian retail mortgage portfolio’(manuscript).unemployment rate, EXCHR represents the percentage
deviation of the CHF/HUF exchange rate level at which the
individual loan was granted from the ‘actual’ CHF/HUF
exchange rates, and finally, IR denotes the domestic and
foreign interest rates. The estimation was prepared on the
basis of data for the period from January 2003 to June 2008.
The main findings are summarised in Table 2.
The results suggest that forint-denominated loans are less
risky than FX loans.
6 This, on the one hand, can be explained
with the smaller fluctuations in the instalments of forint-
denominated loans compared to FX loans (there is no change
in debt servicing costs due to exchange rate depreciation, the
repricing period is longer and most forint-denominated
housing loans are interest-rate subsidised). On the other
hand, the period when a large portion of forint mortgages
7
were granted (i.e. between 2000 and 2004) was characterised
by tight lending standards, hence it was mostly high quality
borrowers that had access to these products.
The results also show that housing loans are less risky
compared to home equity products. This is indeed surprising,
as the two credit types are basically the same (loan granted
against real estate as collateral), but it is an empirical fact that
the quality of the home equity mortgage portfolio is worse
than that of the portfolio of housing loans. One of the
possible underlying explanations is that most housing loans
are intended for purchasing the ‘first home’, and therefore
the willingness to pay these loans is strong. By contrast, home
equity mortgages are mainly for consumption purposes, and
the collateral of the loan is not necessarily the residential
property of the debtor, but maybe some other real estate,
which may also affect the debtor’s payment attitude.
The qualification variable attempts to capture the effect that
the income position and employment opportunities of those
with lower educational levels are usually worse, and they are
more exposed to income shocks caused by economic
fluctuations (e.g. unemployment), which adds to the default
risk of these clients.
The loan-to-value ratio at the time of loan origination has
also proven to be a significant risk factor. The higher the
loan-to-value ratio at which the loan is granted, the lower the
downpayment required by the bank, and the more customers
in tight financial and income positions have the opportunity
to borrow. This may affect both the debtor’s willingness to
pay (if the value of the property declines, it is not worth
repaying the loan) and the customer’s ability to pay. The
impact of the latter appears through the higher instalments
related to the higher amount of the loan (assuming
unchanged maturity and interest conditions), and through
the relevant income-proportionate repayment burden.
Therefore, the default risk of loans extended at high loan-to-
value ratios may be higher than that of loans disbursed with
more conservative LTV ratios.
Finally, the macro indicators (interest rates, unemployment
rate, exchange rate) capture the effects of macro-risk factors
affecting default risks. Macro-risk factors have an impact on
each customer’s solvency, albeit to different degrees. For
example, exchange rate depreciation affects the solvency of
all debtors with FX loans, but its magnitude depends on the
initial exchange rate at which the client became indebted.
8
The underlying reason is that the weaker the exchange rate
was at the time of borrowing, the lower the probability that
repayment problems will arise directly as a result of
permanent, substantial exchange rate depreciation.
Using the estimated parameters of the macro factors of model
(1), the effects of various macro-risk scenarios on the default
probabilities can be determined, that is the so-called ‘stress’
default probabilities can be computed.
Loss given default
Loss given default is the non-recoverable part of a non-
performing loan increased by the amount of costs arising
during the debt collection process. Its value is affected by
factors such as the outstanding loan amount at the time of
default, the length of the collection period, costs arising
during collection and the size of the interest rate used for
discounting money flows arising in various periods.
Considering that – in respect of the factors determining loss
given default – we only have information on the
developments in exposures, the way we approached loss
given default is as follows:
1. If the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of a loan is below 100 per
cent at a given point in time, the bank would not realise
any loss on the given transaction in the event of customer
default, that is the recovery is 100 per cent (the size of the
outstanding exposure is smaller than the value of the
collateral).
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6 Making an exact decision regarding this issue is rather difficult considering the fact, that FX loans constituted 80-90 per cent of new loans in recent years, i.e. FX loans
dominated the portfolio both in terms of loans outstanding and the number of contracts. In the absence of a basis for comparison (the marginal share of households’
forint-denominated mortgage loans within the portfolio), it is not possible to make a precise comparison of mortgage loans of different denominations in terms of
credit risk.
7 Forint denominated home equity loans were not granted practically.
8 In the database, the average exchange rates at the time of loan origination were EUR/HUF 255 and CHF/HUF 162.2. In the event that the value of the ratio at a given point in
time is above 100 per cent, the size of the bank’s potential
loss (i.e. the loss given default) is the portion above 100
per cent of the LTV (the size of the outstanding exposure
exceeds the value of the collateral).
The loan-to-value ratio may exceed 100 per cent for several
reasons. For example, due to exchange rate depreciation, the
forint value of FX exposures changes; in addition, housing
prices may also vary. When determining the LTV of non-
performing customers we took into account the effect of both
factors. In calculating the value of the home we took into
account housing price developments between the date of
borrowing and the default.
It must be mentioned that there may be a close relationship
between the number of defaults and changes in the value of
collaterals. For example, as a result of permanent, substantial
exchange rate deprecation many FX debtors may become
non-performers, that is numerous properties may become
subject to foreclosure, which may lead to a fall in housing
prices and significant increase in banks’ losses.
Exposure
Under exposure we denote the outstanding loans of
customers at a given point in time. The size of the exposure
is determined by the remaining maturity of the loan, the
interest rate condition (fixed, variable) and the currency of
the loan (FX/HUF).
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: LOSS
CALCULATION IN AN EXTREME 
MACRO-RISK SCENARIO
Calculation of the total loan loss requires the determination
of the loss distribution. We determined loss distribution both
in the case without macro shock (baseline) and in an extreme
macro-risk path (the stress scenario in the April 2009 Report
on Financial Stability [10 per cent fall in GDP; EUR/HUF
340]). The procedure was as follows:
1. Default probabilities for each borrower were computed by
using model (1).
9 In the baseline case, the values of the
macro variables in the estimation period were used
(exchange rate, unemployment rate, domestic and foreign
interest rates), while in the stress scenario their shocked
values were employed (assuming unchanged customer and
loan characteristics).
10
2. We take the outstanding mortgage portfolio in June 2008
(the end of the sample period), and generate uniformly
distributed pseudorandom numbers on the interval [0,1)
for each borrower. If the default probability of the
borrower exceeded the random number (separately in the
baseline and in the macro shock case), then the exposure
was considered to be in default.
3. The bank incurs a loss on a non-performing debtor if the
customer’s loan-to-value (LTV) ratio exceeds 100 per cent.
In the baseline, in determining the LTV we took into
account housing price changes between the date of
borrowing and the date of the default. LTV calculation
along the macro-risk scenario was different from the above
to the extent that in the case of FX exposures we also took
into account the effects of exchange rate deprecation (the
forint value of the existing exposure changes) and a 20 per
cent decline in housing prices.
4. Loss on the debtor level is the product of the outstanding
exposure and the above-100 per cent part of the LTV. By
summing up the individual losses, the portfolio share of
total retail mortgage loan loss is computed. This procedure
ensures that default depends on its own PD, and also
considers to some extent the PD-LGD correlation, as LTV
is included both in the PD scorecard and the model for the
loss rate.
5.  Repeating points 2-4, 10,000 times results in the loss
distributions shown in Chart 2. We assumed a one-year
risk horizon in the calculations.
Knowing the loss distribution (which shows the distribution
of the 10,000 portfolio-proportionate loss realisations),
allows us to calculate the total retail mortgage loan loss of the
banking sector, which only requires to determine the 99.9th
percentile of the distribution,
11 and then multiplying the
resulting figure with the end-2008 retail mortgage loan
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9 As the model of the probability of default was estimated on the basis of a period that was not characterised by significant macroeconomic turbulences, the model
parameters of macro variables presumably underestimate the effect of macro shocks on default risks.
10 In the model, the effect of GDP does not appear directly, but through the change in unemployment.
11The given percentile of the loss distribution gives the extent of loss coverage. For example, at a confidence level of 99.9 per cent, the capital and the reserve will not
be sufficient to cover the loss in only 1 case out of 1,000. Of course, the lower we ‘set’the confidence level, the more cases (‘state of nature’) there will be when the
capital and the reserve will not cover the losses. Therefore, the deviation of the selected confidence level from 100 per cent can also be interpreted as the probability
of a bank’s insolvency. The 99.9th percentile used in the calculations is widely used in domestic and international bank practices in determining the economic capital
needs.portfolio stock (in an implicit manner we assume that the
retail mortgage loan portfolio of the three banks is
representative from the aspect of the banking sector).
According to our results, on the basis of the ‘baseline loss
distribution’ (the distribution marked in blue in Chart 2) the
total loss on retail mortgage loans would amount to HUF 118
billion (approx. 2 per cent of the end-2008 retail mortgage
loan portfolio), which would increase to HUF 372 billion
(approx. 6 per cent of the end-2008 retail mortgage loan
portfolio of the banking sector) in the stress scenario.
SUMMARY
Using the retail mortgage loan portfolio of three commercial
banks, this article analysed the portfolio’s risk characteristics,
identified the main customer-specific and product-specific
factors, as well as market and macroeconomic factors
influencing portfolio quality, and computed banking sector
losses on retail mortgage loans in an extreme macro-stress
scenario (10 per cent decline in GDP, and EUR/HUF 340).
Our results suggest that the riskiness of loans granted in
different years differs substantially. The lifecycle of credits
granted later (e.g. in 2007) is less favourable compared to
earlier ones (e.g. loans granted in 2004). In the case of
subsequently granted mortgages, the share of non-
performing loans within total loans granted in a given year is
higher, as a function of time elapsed from loan origination.
Based on our estimation results, the denomination structure
of loans, the initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the
customer’s education level can be considered as the main
customer-specific and product-specific factors affecting
developments in defaults, while the unemployment rate,
domestic and foreign interest rates as well as the exchange
rate constitute the major macro risk factors that have an
impact on defaults.
According to our calculations, the loss on the retail mortgage
loan portfolio increases considerably in the macro-stress
scenario. Along the stress path, the total loan loss of the
banking sector would increase from the baseline level of HUF
118 billion to HUF 372 billion, which is approximately 6 per
cent of the banking sector’s end-2008 retail mortgage loan
portfolio.
In evaluating the results one must keep some further issues in
mind. Namely, in the calculations we neglect to measure how
the shock propagation affects other sectors in the economy,
and how asset prices are affected, which may generate
additional, even substantial losses through the deterioration
of other banking portfolios and through the decline in
collateral values.
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Chart 2
Simulated loss distributions of the retail mortgage
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